Last Seminar

1. What is cognitive phemomenology supposed to be? Do you think there is such a thing?
2. What are the two types of restrictivism/conservatism?
3. Can introspection settle the arugment for/against for us? Why/why not?
4. What is the 'life is intresting' argument?
5. What is Prinz's view? What do you think of it?

Access Con.

Reading: Block,  'Concepts of Consciousness' and Dennet 'Commentary On Block'

Questions:

1. What is (according to Block) the difference between A. consciousness and P. consciousness?
2. What types of mental states have A con?
3. Thoughts/cognitions are conscious if and only if what? (according to Block)
4. Block has 2 examples he thinks show that you can have A con without P con, and vica versa. What are these examples? What do you think of them?
5. How are Dennet's notions of richness of contenet and degree of infulence meant to explain away the examples from question 4? Do you agree with Dennet?

Higher Order Theories Of Awareness

Questions:

1. What is the difference between higher order and same order theories?

2. In the higher order theory, which state is conscious?

3. What is the Mis Match Problem? How might you respond?

4. Can you have a higher order state which mispresents itself as being in a state when you are not in any state? In that case, what state would be conscious?

5. Can you have a higher order representation of pain when there is no 1st order state of pain? Can you have unconscious pain?

Perception 2

Reading, before the lecture:
1. Montague, M. 2009.

2. Zahavi, D. 2006.



Questions:


1. According to the Brentian view:

What is a conscious experience?

Is what makes something conscious internal or not?

Are all perceptions conscious?

What are the intentional properties of an experience? Eg a perception of a red car would be about;
A.
B.
C.


2. Is the Brentian view compatible with Tye? Why/why not?

3. What is a mode of presentation (a Fregan idea)? (You may have to get this from the reading)

4. Whats Zahavi's view?

5. Can I think something without being aware of it? What do you think? If you can, what would that show?

Perception

Reading (in time for the lecture):

Tye, M. 2002. ‘Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited’, in Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical Readings, ed. D. Chalmers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Questions:


1. What are the broad and narrow uses of qualia? Which one does Tye deny? Why?

2. What is the transparency thesis? What is Representationlism? What is the realtionship between the two?

3. Can you think of counter examples to Tye's claim? How might he respond?

4. What are the following examples? What are they supposed to show?

A) Inverted spectrum
B)Peacocke’s tree case
C)Inverted Earth

5. What is the realtionship between an experiences intentional content and its phenomological content?

Fodor - A Theory Of Content

Reading:
Fodor - A Theory Of Content
Chaphter 3

Questions
1. Converntional wisdom says what about Intentional Realism? What is intentional realism?

2. Complete the following (according to what Skinner would say);
2. a. CAT: The english word "cat" expresses .......
2. b. The fact 'CAT' reduces to the fact ...........

3. According to your answer in 2, what is the chance of you uttering "cat" in the presence of felines *before* you learn english? What about after you learn english? Is this really right? If its not, does that show anything?

4. Look at you answer to 2b. Have you used any "crypto - intentional" terms? What is a crypto intentional term? Does this matter for a theory of behaviorism? Does this matter for a theory of semantics?

5. What is Drerske's account of information carrying? Is it teleological?

6. What does Dreske say about error? (Ie how is the error problem supposed to be sloved)

7. How might you cash out what it is to be a normal situtaion in telelogical terms?

8. What is the account given of mental states at the top of pg 65? Try to write this out *in your own terms*, think about how you would explain it to your non philosophy student friends.

9. Whats Millikan's objection a the bottom of pg 65? Whats the response?

10. Can intentionality be naturalizied?

Dreske's Recipe For Thought

We'll be concentrating on
Dreske - A recipe for thought.
(Remember that you the Fodor is also a required reading)

Questions:
1. "Recipe's for thought cant have interpretive attititudes or explanatory states among the ingrediants'. Does Dreske agree with this? What metaphor does he use to explain why/why not?

2. What does Dreske's say some naturalistic recipes look like (see bottom of the second page). Why does he think this is a mistake?

3. Look up INTENSIONAL (note the 's'). What does it mean?

4. What does Dreske think that the link between intenSional and inenTional is?

5. What is an opaque context? Think of your own example. Are intentional states opaque?

6. What does Dreske say re:misrepresentation?

7. The heart and kidneys have what type of natural function? Try to think of another example of this type.

8. What is an ontogentic natural function?

9. What is the disjunction problem? What does Fodor say? What does Dreske say?

10. What is Dreske's recipe for thought? Try to think of an objection to the theory.

Crane on Mental Representation

Reading: Crane, The Mechanical Mind, Chaphter 5 (2nd reading on blackboard)

Questions:

Before the seminar, please consider the below questions. You do not need to write the answers down (though of course you can if that helps you) but please take some time to think about them. If you cant answer the below (especially the first few) then you probably havent understood the reading. It might be helpful to do it again slowly, focusing on the questions, email me, or turn up at the seminar with specific issues/questions I can help you with.

1. In this paper Crane looks for a reductive defintion for what? (pg 171) Whats a reductive defintion? Are all defintions reductive?

2. He first considers what theory of mental representation? (pg 175)

3. What does Grice mean by 'natural meaning'? Think of an example (not the one given in the paper, your own example)

4. What is the crude causal theory? (According to Fodor) What are its problems?

5. What is the problem of error?

6. "Perhaps ... the reduction of representation should look at not just the inputs to mental states, but at their outputs". Why does Crane suggest this? What does he mean by this suggestion?

7. How would the above (qu 6) suggestion deal with a belief that never caused me to do anything? Do you have any beliefs which have never caused you to do anything? Do you think the suggestion on pg 188 manages to account for these? Are there any other problems with the suggestion on pg 188?

8. What is the biological theory? Can it deal with sophisticated mental states?

9. What is the objection rasied to the biological theory on pg 191? Is there a reply?

10. "If aboutness is real, it must really be something else" (Fodor). Why does Fodor say this? Does Crane agree? Do you? Why/why not?