Perception 2

Reading, before the lecture:
1. Montague, M. 2009.

2. Zahavi, D. 2006.



Questions:


1. According to the Brentian view:

What is a conscious experience?

Is what makes something conscious internal or not?

Are all perceptions conscious?

What are the intentional properties of an experience? Eg a perception of a red car would be about;
A.
B.
C.


2. Is the Brentian view compatible with Tye? Why/why not?

3. What is a mode of presentation (a Fregan idea)? (You may have to get this from the reading)

4. Whats Zahavi's view?

5. Can I think something without being aware of it? What do you think? If you can, what would that show?

Perception

Reading (in time for the lecture):

Tye, M. 2002. ‘Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited’, in Philosophy of Mind: Contemporary and Classical Readings, ed. D. Chalmers. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Questions:


1. What are the broad and narrow uses of qualia? Which one does Tye deny? Why?

2. What is the transparency thesis? What is Representationlism? What is the realtionship between the two?

3. Can you think of counter examples to Tye's claim? How might he respond?

4. What are the following examples? What are they supposed to show?

A) Inverted spectrum
B)Peacocke’s tree case
C)Inverted Earth

5. What is the realtionship between an experiences intentional content and its phenomological content?